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Abstract	
This	is	the	first	paper	identifying	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation	
using	 data	 from	 Vietnam.	 The	 paper	 takes	 an	 advantage	 of	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
compulsory	primary	schooling	reform	that	was	introduced	in	Vietnam	in	1991	to	instrument	
for	exogenous	variations	 in	years	of	 schooling	 to	surmount	 the	endogeneity	problem	as	a	
primary	 threat	 to	 idenfication	 facing	 the	 causal	 effect	 estimation.	 The	 paper	 finds	 that	
education	 is	positively	 associated	with	non-wage	benefits.	 In	particular,	 the	baseline	2SLS	
estimates	indicates	that	one	additional	year	of	schooling	is	causally	linked	to	a	6	percentage	
point	 increase	 in	 the	 likelihood	of	 receiving	monetary	payments	 for	public	holidays,	 a	4.6	
percentage	point	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	receiving	monetary	employee	benefits,	a	7.3	
percentage	point	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	having	annual	paid	leave	and	a	6.8	percentage	
point	 increase	 in	 the	 likelihood	 of	 having	 firm-provided	 social	 insurance.	 The	 baseline	
estimates	are	strongly	robust	to	the	estimates	from	some	robustness	checks.	The	paper	also	
inspects	 that	 the	 causal	 associations	 between	 schooling	 and	 formal	 employment,	 skilled	
occupation	 and	 employee-friendly	 firm	 are	 three	 potential	 mechanisms	 through	 which	
schooling	causally	affects	non-wage	compensation.		
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1	 Introduction	
Quantifying	the	private	returns	to	schooling	in	labor	markets	has	become	a	canonical	topic	in	
economics	 over	many	 decades	 especially	 since	 the	 application	 of	 the	Mincerian	 equation	
(Heckman	et	al.	2003;	Mincer	1974).	Importantly,	while	there	has	been	an	enormous	number	
of	studies	devoted	towards	estimating	the	causal	effect	of	education	on	wage	as	a	primary	
labor	market	outcome,	extremely	less	attention	has	been	provided	to	identifying	non-wage	
compensation	benefits	of	schooling	(Oreopoulos	and	Salvanes	2011).	Apparently,	there	is	a	
research	gap	of	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation	from	the	existing	
literature.1		
Non-wage	forms	of	compensation	enormously	contribute	to	workers’	well-being	in	the	
workplace	(Budd	2004;	Dale-Olsen	2006).	To	a	certain	extent,	non-wage	benefits	play	a	very	
vital	 role	 as	workers’	 social	 protections	 in	 the	workplace	 from	 the	 vulnerability	 stemming	
from	 both	 internal	 and	 external	 shocks.	 Therefore,	 understanding	 non-wage	 benefits	 is	
especially	 salient	 to	 acquire	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 insight	 into	 the	 private	 returns	 to	
schooling	in	the	labor	market	(Oreopoulos	and	Salvanes	2011).	The	current	study	significantly	
fulfills	the	research	gap	by	providing	empirical	evidence	on	the	effect	of	schooling	on	non-
wage	compensation	using	data	from	Vietnam.		
																																																						
1	Non-wage	benefits	are	very	indispensable	forms	of	compenstation	that	includes	both	monetary	non-wage	and	
non-monetary	non-wage	elements	of	compensation	a	firm	provides	to	its	employees	further	away	than	typical	
wage	and	salary	payments	(Budd	2004).	Monetary	non-wage	benefits	consist	of	profit-sharing	remuneration,	
lump-sum	 bonuses,	 stock	 options	 and	 other	 contingent	 payments.	Meanwhile,	 non-monetary	 non-wage	 or	
fringe	benefits	are	made	up	of	employee	benefits	such	as	employer-provided	health	insurance,	sick	pay,	paid	
holidays,	annual	paid	leave,	dental	insurance,	training	aids,	unemployment	benefits	and	retirement	benefits.	
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Furthermore,	it	is	interesting	to	implement	such	studies	using	the	context	of	developing	
countries	because	in	these	countries	non-wage	compensation	benefits	are	heterogeneously	
provided	by	firms.	A	stylized	fact	of	the	distribution	of	firms	in	developing	countries	 is	the	
ubiquitous	presence	of	informal,	small-sized	and	family	firms	which	constitute	the	informal	
sector	(Gollin	2008;	Rauch	1991).	Although	informal	firms	play	a	very	important	role	in	job	
creations	for	workers	especially	low-skilled	laborers	(Banerjee	and	Duflo	2007),	they	function	
differently	relative	to	formal	firms	in	particular	the	provision	of	compensation	for	informal	
employments	(La	Porta	and	Shleifer	2014).		
Specifically,	 informal	 firms	 do	 typically	 not	 attach	 non-wage	 benefits	 to	 a	 paid	 job’s	
compensation	package	(McCaig	and	Pavcnik	2015).	There	are	some	reasons	for	this	stylized	
fact.	 Importantly,	 under	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 inadequate	 legal	 enforcement	 firms	 simply	
choose	to	elude	the	compliance	of	labor	market	regulations	about	the	assurance	of	standard	
working	conditions	as	well	as	the	provision	of	social	protections	via	non-wage	benefits	for	
their	employees	in	order	to	minimize	costs	related	to	labor	uses	(Goldberg	and	Pavcnik	2003;	
Mao	et	al.	2013;	Paz	2014;	Schneider	and	Enste	2000).	As	well,	because	of	being	informal	and	
small-sized	firms,	they	are	not	sufficiently	affordable	to	pay	for	costs	associated	with	non-
wage	benefits	 rather	than	comparatively	 low	salaries.	 It	 is	suggestive	of	being	that	almost	
fundamental	 causes	 for	 this	 fact	 are	 most	 likely	 rooted	 in	 the	 existence	 of	 weakly	
institutionalized	labor	markets	without	strongly	insitutional	arrangements	from	the	context	
of	developing	countries	(Pagés	et	al.	2014).	Consequently,	 informal	workers	are	extremely	
vulnerable	to	the	shocks	during	their	working	careers	due	to	the	lack	of	essential	employment	
securities,	 social	 and	 health	 protections	 provided	 by	 firms	 (Mannila	 2015).	 The	 reality	 of	
heterogeneously	 paid	 non-wage	 compensation	 provides	 a	 profound	 background	 for	
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examining	the	importance	of	schooling	for	the	explanation	of	non-wage	differentials	in	low-
income	countries	like	Vietnam.		
Vietnam	has	a	very	striking	background	for	the	current	study	in	terms	of	its	context	of	
development.	The	economic	reforms	that	Vietnam	has	implemented	since	1986	under	the	
name	of	renovation	(Đổi	Mới	in	Vietnamese)	has	crucial	effects	on	the	functioning	of	labor	
markets	 in	 this	 transition	 economy.	General	 speaking,	 before	1986	Vietnam	had	no	 labor	
markets	because	its	economy	worked	as	a	centrally	planned	system.	Under	such	an	economy,	
all	allocations	related	to	employment	such	as	the	volume	of	jobs,	the	amount	of	workers	or	
wage	 were	 dominantly	 decided	 by	 the	 central	 state.	 In	 contrast,	 in	 the	 era	 of	 economic	
renovation	 Vietnam	 has	 initiated	 and	 developed	 its	 labor	 markets	 where	 there	 are	 the	
interactive	functionings	of	the	demand	for	and	the	supply	of	labor	in	some	extent	to	allocate	
human	resources	in	the	economy.	
However,	 it	 is	 reasonably	admitted	 that	Vietnam	has	 so	 far	 a	weakly	 institutionalized	
labor	 market	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 labor	 market	 institutions	 and	 policies	 are	 inefficiently	
functioned	and	 insufficiently	 implemented	as	well	 (Schmillen	and	Packard	2016)	 and	 thus	
there	 is	 the	 co-existence	 of	 both	 formal	 and	 informal	 labor	 markets	 in	 this	 low-income	
economy	(Rand	and	Torm	2012).	Under	a	weakly	 institutionalized	 labor	market,	non-wage	
benefits	that	firms	provided	for	Vietnamese	workers	are	arguably	heterogeneous,	especially	
between	formal	and	informal	employement	sectors	(Argente	and	García	2015).	Hence,	the	
study	of	the	effect	of	schooling	on	non-wage	benefits	is	tremendously	important	because	in	
that	context	the	role	of	education	in	determining	non-wage	benefits	received	by	workers	with	
various	 educational	 outcomes	 is	 hypothetically	 revealed	 more	 apparently	 (Schmillen	 and	
Packard	2016).	
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Also,	 during	 the	 same	 period	 of	 economic	 reforms	 Vietnam	 has	 experienced	 the	
remarkable	expansion	of	its	educational	system	due	to	an	increasing	demand	for	schooling	
that	is	originated	from	a	higher	demand	for	quintessential	workers.	In	this	context,	education	
plays	a	very	important	role	in	the	Vietnamese	labor	market	in	terms	of	both	increasing	the	
quality	 of	workers	 and	 improving	 living	 standards	 for	Vietnamese	 citizens.	 Investments	 in	
education	is	costly	and	how	large	the	returns	to	schooling	is	in	the	labor	market	economically	
incentivizes	workers	for	doing	such	investments.	However,	numerous	studies	on	the	private	
returns	to	schooling	from	the	literature	in	Vietnam	and	other	developing	economies	alike	has	
well-concentrated	on	wage	as	a	key	labor	market	outcome.	There	is	no	research	estimating	
the	non-wage	returns	to	schooling.	However,	workers’	payoffs	for	investments	in	schooling	
are	reflected	not	only	by	wage	returns	but	also	non-wage	benefits.	The	estimates	of	merely	
wage	 returns	 to	 schooling	 that	 ignore	 non-wage	 benefits	 seemingly	 under-evaluates	 the	
whole	effect	of	education	on	labor	market	outcomes.	The	current	study	fills	this	gap	by	giving	
the	first	evidence	on	the	causal	link	between	schooling	and	non-wage	compensation	in	the	
related	literature	using	data	from	Vietnam.	
A	central	hitch	with	the	empirical	identification	of	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	labor	
market	 outcomes	 is	 that	 schooling	 is	 likely	 connected	 with	 many	 latent	 personal	
characteristics	 that	 are	 also	 probably	 related	 to	 labor	 market	 outcomes.	 This	 problem	
indicates	that	estimated	associations	between	education	and	labor	market	outcomes	merely	
demonstrate	the	omitted	variations	rather	than	a	reliable	causal	relationship.	To	conquer	this	
problem,	the	current	study	utilizes	the	policy	of	compulsory	primary	schooling	in	Vietnam	in	
1991	that	mandated	a	compulsory	primary	education	for	all	Vietnamese	children	aged	under	
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15	at	the	time	of	policy.2	The	alteration	in	educational	attainment	induced	by	this	educational	
reform	 is	 therefore	 unrelated	 to	 other	 unobserved	 individual	 charactertistics	 that	 also	
determine	labor	market	outcomes.	
Using	household	survey	data	from	Vietnam	between	2010	and	2014,	this	study	finds	that	
education	does	cause	a	favorable	effect	on	non-wage	compensation.	The	positive	effect	of	
education	 on	 non-wage	 benefits	 are	 discovered	 by	 using	 OLS,	 2SLS	 and	 reduced-form	
estimators.	In	particular,	the	baseline	OLS	estimates	show	that	workers	going	to	schools	for	
one	more	year	are	more	likely	to	gain	non-wage	benefits,	specifically	monetary	payments	for	
public	 holidays	 by	 4.4	 percentage	 points,	monetary	 employee	 benefits	 by	 2.6	 percentage	
points,	annual	paid	leave	by	6.6	percentage	points	and	firm-provided	social	insurance	by	6.5	
percentage	points	compared	to	the	counterparts.	The	baseline	2SLS	estimates	indicate	that	
an	 additional	 year	 of	 schooling	 is	 causally	 linked	 to	 a	 6	 percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	
likelihood	 of	 receiving	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	 holidays,	 a	 4.6	 percentage	 point	
increase	in	the	likelihood	of	receiving	monetary	employee	benefits,	a	7.3	percentage	point	
increase	in	the	likelihood	of	having	annual	paid	leave	and	a	6.8	percentage	point	increase	in	
the	likelihood	of	having	firm-provided	social	insurance.	Furthermore,	reduced-form	estimates	
illustrate	that	workers	exposed	to	the	reform	are	more	likely	to	achieve	non-wage	benefits	
than	 those	 who	 were	 out	 of	 the	 reform,	 in	 particular	 for	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	
holidays	by	11.4	percentage	points,	monetary	employee	benefits	by	8.8	percentage	points,	
annual	 paid	 leave	 by	 13.8	 percentage	 points	 and	 firm-provided	 social	 insurance	 by	 13	
percentage	points.	Interestingly,	it	is	obvious	that	the	impact	of	schooling	is	larger	for	fringe	
																																																						
2	 The	1991	 compulsory	 schooling	 reform	 in	Vietnam	was	used	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 exogeneous	 changes	 in	
schooling	from	some	recent	studies	related	to	the	causal	effects	of	schooling	in	health	care	utilization	or	political	
outcomes	for	examples	Dang	(2017a,	2017b).		
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(non-monetary	 non-wage)	 benefits	 than	 monetary	 non-wage	 benefits	 by	 using	 all	 three	
estimation	models.		
This	 paper	 furthermore	 inspects	 several	 essential	 channels	 through	 which	 schooling	
might	effects	the	probability	to	gain	non-wage	benefits	in	the	workplace.	One	likelihood	is	
more	 education	 increases	 the	 chance	 for	 working	 in	 the	 formal	 sector	 rather	 than	 the	
informal	 sector.	Workers	working	with	a	 formal	employment	 tend	 to	earn	 improved	non-
wage	 compensation.	 Another	 possible	 factor	 is	 that	 acquiring	 more	 schooling	 give	 more	
likelihoods	for	workers	to	achive	a	skilled	occupation	that	in	turn	enables	them	more	likely	to	
obtain	non-wage	compensation.	Finally,	the	possibility	to	working	for	an	employee-friendly	
firm	might	 be	higher	 for	 the	more	 educated	workers.	Workers	working	 for	 an	 employee-
friendly	firm	probably	are	more	likely	to	gain	non-wage	compensation.		
The	remainder	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	2	describes	the	Vietnamese	
compulsory	 schooling	 reform	 and	 previous	 literature	 related	 to	 returns	 to	 schooling	 in	
Vietnam.	 Data	 and	 the	 sample	 are	 discussed	 in	 section	 3	 while	 estimation	 methods	 are	
presented	in	section	4.	Sections	5,	6	and	7	respectively	report	baseline	empirical	results,	the	
results	of	robustness	checks	and	the	inspection	of	potential	mechanisms	to	explain	the	causal	
effect	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation.	Finally,	discussion	and	conclusion	are	made	
in	section	8.		
	
2	 The	Vietnamese	Compulsory	Schooling	Reform	and	Returns	to	
Schooling	in	Vietnam	
2.1	 The	Vietnamese	Compulsory	Schooling	Reform	
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After	the	1975	unification	of	the	whole	country,	Vietnam	had	a	very	insufficiently-developed	
educational	system	due	to	a	very	difficult	situation	of	a	post-war	period	(London	2011).	The	
educational	attainment	rates	were	very	low	compare	to	other	same	context	countries	in	Asia.	
Moreover,	nearly	ten	years	for	a	centrally	planned	economy,	Vietnam	seemingly	 lossed	its	
educational	development.	The	extreme	lack	of	resources	and	the	closeness	of	the	economy	
as	well	made	the	educational	system	in	this	low-income	country	had	become	worse.		
In	 1986,	 the	 government	 of	 Vietnam	 launched	 an	 economic	 reform	 that	 is	 called	
renovation	under	the	name	of	Đổi	Mới	in	Vietnamese.	In	line	with	the	policies	for	reforming	
its	economy,	Vietnam	has	attempted	to	transform	its	educational	system	with	many	policies	
as	 efforts	 to	 enhance	 the	 nation’s	 human	 capital	 stock	 for	 economic	 growth	 and	 the	
transformation	 of	 the	 whole	 economy	 (Kinh	 and	 Chi	 2008).	 One	 of	 the	 most	 important	
educational	policies	is	the	compulsory	primary	schooling	reform	for	all	Vietnamese	children	
that	 was	 introduced	 in	 1991	 (Kamibeppu	 2009).	 This	 reform	 formally	 worked	 under	 a	
legislative	framework	of	the	Law	on	Universal	Primary	Education	(LUPE).		
Under	the	reform,	all	Vietnamese	children	has	been	forced	to	go	to	primary	schools	at	
the	age	of	6	years	old	for	the	first	grade	and	completed	the	primary	level	at	15	years	old	for	
the	 fifth	 grade.	 In	other	words,	 15	 years	old	became	 the	maximum	age	 for	 freely	 leaving	
schools	 in	 Vietnam	 as	 the	 regulation	 of	 LUPE.	With	 this	 legislative	 approval,	 Vietnamese	
citizens	who	were	born	in	1977	and	later	were	fully	exposed	to	the	schooling	reform	while	
those	whose	years	of	birth	lower	than	1977	were	out	of	the	reform.	It	is	expected	that	this	
intervention	makes	average	year	of	schooling	is	higher	for	the	group	of	Vietnamese	children	
exposed	to	the	reform	than	that	for	those	who	were	out	of	the	reform.		
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Before	 this	 reform,	 Vietnam	 had	 no	 any	 year	 of	 compulsory	 schooling.	 Chidren’s	
schooling	 vastly	 depended	 on	 households’	 individual	 decisions	 based	 on	 their	 resources.	
Generally	speaking,	there	had	been	no	formal	interventions	from	the	government	to	change	
years	of	schooling	for	Vietnamese	children	(Viet	2009).	With	this	policy,	there	profoundly	was	
an	increase	in	the	number	of	compulsory	schooling	years	from	zero	to	five,	equivalently	the	
completion	of	primary	education.	To	do	this,	the	government	of	Vietnam	aimed	to	increase	
average	years	of	schooling,	espcially	for	people	in	rural	and	remote	areas	in	this	transition	
economy.	In	reality,	the	1991	reform	is	really	a	crucial	policy	with	remarkable	results	it	has	
created	 to	 increase	 educational	 attainment	 among	 Vietnamese	 citizens.	 Illustratively,	 the	
statistics	 from	 World	 Bank	 (2017)	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 fractions	 of	 gross	 primary	
educational	attainment	had	apparently	increased	over	the	period	of	post-reform	compared	
to	the	pre-reform	period.	In	particular,	while	the	figures	were	highly	stable	with	around	104	
percent	between	1983–1990,	the	fractions	of	gross	primary	enrollment	had	rised	over	the	
period	of	1992–1997	for	examples	approximately	107	percent	in	1992,	112	percent	in	1994	
and	115	percent	in	1997.		
	
2.2	 Returns	to	Schooling	in	Vietnam	
Education	has	been	regarded	as	a	significant	driver	of	the	changes	in	economic,	political	and	
social	aspects	during	the	era	of	economic	reforms	in	Vietnam	(Huong	and	Fry	2004).	The	role	
of	education	in	explaining	the	labor	market	outcomes	in	Vietnam	is	well-documented	over	
few	decades.	Almost	studies	focus	on	the	link	between	schooling	and	wage	or	income	during	
the	age	of	economic	reform	in	this	transition	economy.	The	results	show	positive	impacts	of	
schooling	on	labor	market	outcomes	in	Vietnam	during	its	economic	reform	period	(Phan	and	
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Coxhead	2013).	However,	it	is	more	vital	to	discuss	estimation	methods	has	been	used	from	
availabe	studies	to	identify	if	achieved	estimates	are	reliable	to	inform	the	causal	effect.		
Initial	 studies	 on	 this	 topic	 in	 Vietnam	 all	 used	 the	 conventional	Mincerian	 equation	
(Mincer	1974)	with	a	OLS	estimator	to	estimate	labor	market	benefits	of	schooling.	As	the	
first	study	providing	the	estimate	of	private	returns	to	schooling	in	Vietnam,	Gallup	(2002)	
employs	a	very	essential	OLS	Mincerian	model	to	estimate	wage	returns	to	schooling.	 In	a	
same	manner,	Moock	et	al.	(2003)	finds	that	schooling	measured	by	various	educational	levels	
has	 considerable	 positive	 impacts	 on	 labor	 market	 earnings	 in	 Vietnam	 with	 modified	
Mincerian	 equations	 and	 a	 OLS	 estimator.	 However,	 such	 studies	 that	 merely	 used	 a	
conventional	Mincerian	equation	and	its	augmented	equations	with	a	naive	OLS	estimator	for	
the	 estimation	 could	 not	 produce	 unbised	 estimates	 because	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
endogeneity	 problem.	 Ignoring	 the	 endogeneity	 problem	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
education	 and	 schooling	 is	 a	 very	 extreme	disadvantage	 in	providing	precise	 estimates	of	
private	benefits	of	schooling.	It	is	vastly	challenge	to	use	such	estimates	to	inform	the	causal	
impact	of	education	on	labor	market	outcomes.		
Subsequently,	 the	 literature	 has	 witnessed	 researchers’	 attempts	 to	 produces	 more	
precise	estimates	of	the	impact	of	interest	by	using	other	estimation	approaches	to	account	
for	the	problems	of	endogeneity	(Arcand	et	al.	2004)	or	selection	bias	(Doan	and	John	2010).	
For	instance,	Liu	(2006)	applies	a	basic	demand-and-supply	framework	initiated	by	Katz	and	
Murphy	(1992)	to	interestingly	discover	that	education	make	changes	the	demand	towards	
educated	workers	and	thus	imposes	wage	differentials.	Kinh	and	Westbrook	(2012)	provide	
evidence	on	the	impact	of	schooling	on	household	welfare	in	Vietnam	using	an	IV	estimator.	
In	particular,	Kinh	and	Westbrook	arguably	used	a	mean	value	of	educational	outcome	from	
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the	 same	 group	 with	 similar	 characteristics	 such	 as	 age,	 gender,	 cohort	 and	 location	 to	
instrument	 for	exogenous	changes	 in	a	 respondent’s	educational	outcome.	They	 find	 that	
education	 plays	 a	 substantial	 role	 in	 improving	 consumption	 expenditure	 for	 Vietnamese	
families.			
Oostendorp	 and	 Doan	 (2013)	 strive	 to	 examine	 not	 only	 wage	 but	 also	 employment	
effects	of	schooling	and	find	the	positive	impacts	of	schooling	on	labor	market	outcomes	in	
Vietnam.	Moreover,	Oostendorp	 and	Doan	 attempt	 to	 control	 for	 a	 potential	 problem	of	
selection	bias	by	using	a	modified	functional	form	with	an	additional	part	of	sample	selection	
terms.	Recently,	Doan	et	al.	(2017)	also	use	Heckman’s	two-step	model	to	address	selection	
bias	and	find	that	returns	to	schooling	in	Vietnam	increased	during	the	economic	reform	up	
to	the	2008	global	financial	crisis	but	after	that	the	returns	evidently	decreased.		
Generally	speaking,	previous	studies	on	the	labor	market	benefits	of	schooling	in	Vietnam	
mostly	focus	on	wage	or	earnings.	More	importantly,	the	relationship	between	schooling	and	
labor	market	outcomes	found	from	the	exsisting	literature	in	Vietnam	undeniably	tends	to	be	
correlation	rather	than	true	causality	that	leaves	open	a	research	gap	on	the	causal	effect	of	
schooling	on	labor	market	outcomes	in	Vietnam.	This	study	significantly	fulfills	the	research	
gap	by	estimating	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	non-wage	benefits	in	Vietnam.		
	
3	 Data	and	the	Sample	
This	study	uses	three	waves	of	Vietnam	Household	Living	Standards	Survey	(VHLSS)	(2010,	
2012	 and	 2014	 surveys)	 to	 estimate	 the	 causal	 effect	 of	 education	 on	 non-wage	
compensation	from	the	labor	markets	in	Vietnam.	The	VHLSS	is	a	nationally	representative	
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household	survey	that	has	been	conducted	biannually.	The	first	VHLSS	wave	was	carried	out	
in	2002.	Generally,	in	each	survey	roughly	40,000	individuals	from	about	9,000	households	
across	Vietnam	were	asked	to	elicit	fundamental	information	on	demographics,	education,	
health,	 employment,	 household	 expenditure,	 household	 assets,	 housing	 and	 agricultural	
production.	 This	 study	 exploits	 data	 from	 sections	 of	 demographics,	 education	 and	
employment	from	the	VHLSS	surveys	of	2010,	2012	and	2014	to	create	essential	variables	for	
the	sample.		
To	form	the	sample	for	the	analysis,	this	study	limits	all	respondents	who	were	formally	
working	with	a	paid	job	from	the	labor	markets	at	the	time	of	surveys.	These	respondents	
played	 a	 role	 as	 active	 workers	 from	 the	 current	 labor	 force	 from	 2010,	 2012	 and	 2014	
VHLSSs.	 In	terms	of	the	sample	for	the	main	empirical	analysis,	 the	paper	uses	those	who	
were	born	between	1968	and	1985.	This	is	equivalent	to	the	the	choice	of	±9	bandwiths	in	
which	the	1977	cohort	plays	a	role	as	the	birth-year	cutoff	to	divided	the	whole	sample	into	
the	treatment	and	the	control	groups.	The	treatment	group	only	includes	workers	were	born	
between	1977	and	1985	who	were	fully	exposed	to	the	1991	schooling	reform.	Whereas,	the	
control	group	consists	of	those	whose	birth	years	between	1968	and	1976	were	out	of	the	
same	reform.		
It	 is	crucial	to	define	non-wage	compensation	variables	used	in	this	study.	Despite	the	
existence	of	a	wide	range	of	non-wage	compensation	forms	from	the	 literture,	due	to	the	
availability	of	related	information	from	VHLSS	data	this	study	only	employs	four	proxies	for	
non-wage	 compensation	 including	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	 holidays,	 monetary	
employee	benefits,	annual	paid	leave,	and	firm-provided	social	insurance.	These	dependent	
variables	are	all	measured	in	percentage	terms.	For	the	first	dependent	variable,	monetary	
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payments	for	public	holidays	is	a	binary	variable	equals	1	if	a	worker	receives	any	payment	
for	public	holidays	in	Vietnam	according	to	the	Labor	Code	and	zero	otherwise.3	Second,	the	
variable	of	monetary	employee	benefits	 is	also	a	dummy	that	take	a	value	of	1	 if	a	worker	
receives	any	employee	benefits	such	as	boneses,	uniform	costs,	lunch	costs,	allowances	for	
business	travels,	 illness	costs,	costs	of	pregnancy	check-ups	or	costs	of	acciendents	during	
working	time	and	zero	otherwise.	Third,	annual	paid	leave	is	also	a	binary	variable	that	takes	
1	if	a	worker	has	annual	paid	leave	and	zero	otherwise.	Finally,	the	fourth	dependent	variable	
takes	a	value	of	1	if	a	worker	has	firm-provided	social	insurance	from	an	offered	compensation	
package	and	zero	otherwise.	Notably,	among	these	variables	monetary	payments	for	public	
holidays	and	monetary	employee	benefits	are	monetary	non-wage	benefits	while	annual	paid	
leave	and	firm-provided	social	insurance	are	non-monetary	non-wage	(fringe)	benefits.		
Table	1	reports	the	statistical	summary	of	the	sample.	The	whole	sample	for	the	baseline	
analysis	has	7,865	observation	 in	 the	size	with	a	 treatment	group	of	4,694	workers	and	a	
control	 group	 of	 3,171	 workers.	 In	 terms	 of	 basic	 socio-demographic	 characteristics,	 the	
average	age	of	the	whole	sample	is	nearly	34	years	old	while	corresponding	figures	for	the	
treatment	 and	 the	 control	 groups	 are	 respectively	 roughly	 31	 and	 40	 years	 old.	 Among	
available	observations,	 there	are	about	57	percent	male	workers,	54	percent	 respondents	
from	urban	areas,	95	percent	belonging	to	the	majority	group,	and	77	percent	being	married	
at	the	time	of	survey.		
																																																						
3	Under	the	Vietnamese	Labor	Code,	general	public	holidays	consist	of	New	Year’s	Day	(January	1),	Lunar	New	
Year	Festival	 (the	Tet	holiday),	Hung	King’s	Anniversary	Day	 (March	10	of	 the	Lunar	Year),	Reunification	Day	
(April	30),	International	Labor	Day	(May	1)	and	National	Day	(September	2).		
	 14	
Regarding	 the	variables	 related	 to	education,	 the	 rate	of	 respondents	who	were	 fully	
exposed	to	the	1991	schooling	reform	is	approximately	60	percent	for	the	whole	sample.	The	
average	schooling	year	for	the	whole	sample	is	10.6	years	and	the	corresponding	educational	
outcomes	for	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups	are	respectively	about	11.3	and	9.6	years.	
Apparently,	the	treatment	group’s	average	schooling	year	is	higher	than	that	for	the	control	
group.		
Referring	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcomes,	 around	 71	 percent	 workers	 receives	
monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	for	the	whole	sample.	The	corresponding	firgures	for	
the	 treatment	 and	 the	 control	 groups	 are	 respectively	 75	 percent	 and	 65	 percent.	 For	
monetary	employee	benefits,	there	are	approximately	54	percent	workers	from	the	whole	
sample	while	there	are	nearly	57	percent	and	50	percent	workers	from	the	treatment	and	the	
control	groups.	While	nearly	57	percent	respondents	from	the	whole	sample	indicated	that	
they	 receive	 annual	 paid	 leave	 for	 the	 current	 job,	 the	 corresponding	 figures	 from	 the	
treatment	and	the	control	groups	are	respectively	61	percent	and	49	percent.	Roughly	55	
percent	of	respondents	from	the	whole	sample	benefit	from	a	firm-provided	social	insurance	
while	nearly	59	percent	and	48	percent	of	respondents	respectively	from	the	treatment	and	
the	control	groups	receive	this	form	of	non-wage	compensation.	The	statistical	summary	of	
other	variables	are	specifically	presented	in	Table	1.		
	
4	 Estimation	Methods	
To	estimate	the	link	between	schooling	year	and	non-wage	benefits,	this	study	employs	three	
approaches	 including	 (i)	 ordinary	 least	 squares	 (OLS),	 (ii)	 a	 two-equation	 system	 with	 a	
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procedure	of	two-stage	least-squares	(2SLS),	and	(iii)	a	reduced-form	regression.	Let’s	start	
with	the	OLS	estimation,	the	paper	estimates	the	following	equation:	
"#$#%&'( = *+ +	*./0ℎ223&$45#67( + *89′( + ;< + =( 																								(1)	
where	"#$#%&'( 	is	a	non-wage	benefit	measured	by	four	distinct	variables	(the	probability	of	
monetary	 payments	 for	 public	 holidays,	 the	 probability	 of	 having	 monetary	 employee	
benefits,	the	probability	of	receiving	an	annual	paid	leave,	and	the	probability	of	having	firm-
provided	social	 insurance)	 for	 the	worker	 &;	/0ℎ223&$45#67( 	 is	years	of	schooling;	9′( 	 is	a	
vector	of	control	variables	including	age,	squared	age,	a	dummy	for	male	gender,	a	dummy	
for	living	in	an	urban	area,	a	dummy	for	belonging	to	an	ethnic	group	of	majority	(Kinh	or	Hoa	
peoples)	and	a	dummy	for	being	married;	><	is	indicates	survey	year	fixed	effects;	and	=( 	is	an	
idiosyncratic	error	term.	Importantly,	*.	is	the	coefficient	of	interest	that	indicates	the	effect	
of	schooling	years	on	non-wage	compensation	outcomes.		
However,	the	estimation	of	the	effect	of	education	on	non-wage	benefits	using	OLS	likely	
produces	 biased	 estimates	 due	 to	 the	 endogeneity	 problem	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	
education	and	outcomes	of	interest.	How	to	overcome	the	endogenity	problem	in	order	to	
achieve	precise	estimates	of	the	causal	links	between	education	and	labor	market	outcomes	
has	canonically	become	the	most	solicitous	issue	in	applied	econometrics	of	the	study	of	labor	
markets	 over	 several	 decades	 (Card	 2001).	 Recent	 studies	 has	 employed	 compulsory	
schooling	reforms	as	a	contemporarily	fashionable	approach	to	instrument	for	exogeneous	
shifts	 in	 educational	 outcome	 to	 estimate	 the	 causal	 effect	 of	 schooling	 on	 labor	market	
outcomes	 (Devereux	 and	 Hart	 2010;	 Grenet	 2013;	 Oreopoulos	 2006;	 Pischke	 and	 von	
Wächter	2008;	Stephens	and	Yang	2014).		
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This	 study	 uses	 the	 1991	 compulsory	 primary	 schooling	 reform	 that	 mandated	 all	
Vietnamese	children	aged	under	15	at	the	time	of	exposure	reform	to	go	and	complete	the	
primary	school.	Equivalently,	children	who	were	born	since	1977	were	fully	exposed	to	the	
reform	whereas	those	whose	birth	years	prior	to	1977	were	out	of	the	reform.	This	paper	
uses	this	criterion	to	create	the	treatment	and	the	control	groups	for	doing	an	evaluation	of	
the	 impact	 of	 schooling	 on	 non-wage	 benefits	 for	 Vietnamese	 workers.	 Let	 denote	?#%27@ABC2DE7#( 	 as	 the	 probability	 of	 being	 exposed	 to	 the	 reform	 for	 a	 worker	 &,	
mathematically		
?#%27@ABC2DE7#( = = 1	if	"&7'ℎ5#67( ≥ 1977= 0																					2'ℎ#7M&D# 																												(1)	
where	"&7'ℎ5#67( 	is	the	year	of	birth	of	the	worker	&.		
The	variable	of	?#%27@ABC2DE7#( 	 is	used	 to	predict	 schooling	years	 in	 the	 following	
two-equation	system	with	a	two-stage	least-squares	(2SLS)	estimation	procedure.	The	first	
and	second	stages	estimate	the	corresponding	following	regression	functions:	
/0ℎ223&$45#67( = N+ +	N.?#%27@ABC2DE7#( + N89′( + ;< + O( 																(2)	
and		
"#$#%&'( = >+ +	>./0ℎ223P$45#67Q + >89′( + ;< + R( 																										(3)	
where	/0ℎ223P$45#67Q	 in	equation	(3)	 is	the	predicted	value	of	/0ℎ223&$45#67( 	 from	the	
first	 stage	 regression	 in	 equation	 (2).	 The	 coefficient	 of	>.	meaningfully	 reports	 the	 local	
average	treatment	effect	(LATE)	of	years	of	education	on	non-wage	compensation	outcomes.		
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Finally,	 the	paper	uses	a	reduce-form	regression	to	directly	estimate	the	effect	of	 the	
1991	 schooling	 reform	 on	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcomes.	 In	 particular,	 the	 paper	
estimates	the	following	equation:		
"#$#%&'( = S+ +	S.?#%27@ABC2DE7#( + S89′( + ;< + T( 																			(3)	
The	coefficient	of	S.	shows	the	effect	of	the	reform	on	non-wage	compensation	outcomes.		
	
5	 Baseline	Results	
Next,	 the	 paper	 reports	 the	 baseline	 results	 for	 the	 impact	 of	 education	 on	 non-wage	
compensation.	 This	 paper	 first	 explores	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 schooling	 reform	 on	 years	 of	
schooling	 (first-stage	 regression)	 and	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcomes	 (reduced-form	
regressions)	using	key	graphs.	 In	particular,	 the	 first-stage	and	 the	effect	of	 the	 schooling	
reform	on	outcomes	are	geographically	demonstrated	in	Figures	1	and	2.	According	to	Figure	
1,	the	schooling	reform	in	1991	had	a	substantial	effect	on	years	of	education	for	Vietnamese	
workers.	Furthermore,	the	reduced-form	graphs	in	Figure	2	show	considerable	increases	in	
non-wage	compensation	 for	workers	who	were	 full	 exposed	 to	 the	 reform	 relative	 to	 the	
counterparts	for	four	proxies	respectively	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	in	part	(a),	
monetary	employee	benefits	in	part	(b),	annual	paid	leave	in	part	(c)	and	firm-provided	social	
insurance	in	part	(c)	of	Figure	2.		
Furthermore,	 the	 baseline	 estimated	 coefficients	 are	 reported	 in	 Table	 2	 for	 four	
dependent	variables,	in	particular	the	probability	of	receiving	monetary	payments	for	public	
holidays	(column	1),	the	probability	of	receiving	monetary	employee	benefits	(column	2),	the	
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probability	 of	 having	 annual	 paid	 leave	 (column	 3),	 and	 the	 probability	 of	 having	 a	 firm-
provided	social	insurance	(column	4).	For	each	non-wage	compensation	outcome,	the	paper	
estimates	 three	 econometric	 specifications:	 OLS	 (Panel	 A),	 2SLS	 including	 first-stage	
coefficient	and	F-statistics	as	well	(Panel	B),	and	reduced-form	regressions	(Panel	C).	Using	
these	various	models	allow	the	current	paper	to	expedite	the	comparison	of	estimates	of	the	
impact.	Importantly,	the	baseline	sample	includes	individuals	born	in	1968–1985	with	7,865	
observations.	 For	 each	 baseline	 specification,	 the	 set	 of	 control	 variables	 consists	 of	 age,	
squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	married;	and	survey	year	 fixed	effects	 is	are	also	
included.	 Generally,	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 indicate	 that	 education	 has	 a	 significant	
positive	 relationship	with	non-wage	benefits	 for	 all	 four	outcomes	using	 three	estimation	
models.	All	estimated	coefficients	are	statistically	significant	at	1%.		
The	OLS	estimates	 in	Panel	A	of	Table	2	point	out	that	 there	 is	a	significant	 favorable	
connection	 between	 education	 and	 all	 four	 non-wage	 compensation	 measures	 in	 the	
Vietnamese	 workplace.	 Each	 extra	 year	 of	 schooling	 on	 average	 is	 associated	 with	 a	 4.4	
percentage	 point	 increase	 in	 the	 probability	 of	 receiving	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	
holidays	(column	1),	a	2.6	percentage	point	increase	in	the	probability	of	receiving	monetary	
employee	benefits	 (column	2),	a	6.6	percentage	point	 increase	 in	 the	 likelihood	of	having	
annual	paid	leave	(column	3)	and	a	6.5	percentage	point	increase	in	the	likehood	of	having	
firm-provided	social	insurance	(column	4).	It	is	obvious	that	the	impacts	are	larger	for	non-
wage	non-monetary	(fringe)	benefits	than	for	non-wage	monetary	benefits.	
It	is	essential	to	question	that	are	the	OLS	estimates	precisely	inferred	as	a	causal	impact	
of	education	on	non-wage	compensation	or	do	they	merely	reflect	latent	characteristics	that	
are	 correlated	 with	 both	 education	 and	 non-wage	 compensation	 outcome?	 Despite	 the	
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unobservable	factors	related	to	various	survey	years	are	controlled	in	the	estimation	model,	
there	may	 still	 be	 correlated	hidden	determinants	 for	 example	macroeconomic	 indicators	
that	demonstrate	economic	growth	and	firm’s	growth	as	well.	More	importantly,	there	are	
likely	latent	characteristics	associated	with	personal	workers	for	instance	individual	ability	or	
family	backgrounds	that	are	related	to	both	schooling	and	non-wage	benefits.	Admittedly,	
the	 available	 set	 of	 control	 variables	using	 in	OLS	model	 can	not	 satisfactorily	 provide	 an	
acceptable	approach	to	the	endogeneity	problems.	Therefore,	these	OLS	estimates	are	not	
reliably	suggestive	of	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation.	
Thus,	 to	 quantify	 the	 reliable	 causal	 effect	 the	 current	 paper	 employs	 the	 1991	
compulsory	schooling	reform	to	 instrument	for	exogeneous	changes	 in	schooling	years	for	
addressing	the	endogeneity	 issues.	The	paper	estimates	the	 impact	of	the	reform	on	non-
wage	compensation	by	its	impact	on	years	of	education.	In	doing	so,	it	is	assumed	that	the	
mediational	pathway	through	which	the	reform	has	an	impact	on	non-wage	compensation	is	
only	years	of	schooling	and	not	by	way	of	other	features	of	the	reform	such	as	curriculum	
changes,	 well-trained	 teachers	 or	 financial	 assistance.	 The	 results	 of	 2SLS	 estimates	 are	
presented	in	Panel	B	of	Table	2.		
The	 first-stage	estimates	 indicate	 that	 the	 reform	has	a	 significant	positive	 impact	on	
years	 of	 schooling.	 In	 particular,	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	more	 likely	 increases	 a	worker’s	
education	by	about	1.9	years	of	schooling.	Equally	importantly,	the	F-statistics	of	the	excluded	
instrument	 in	 the	 first-stage	 is	 approximately	 76.06,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 reform	 is	
satisfactorily	associated	with	schooling	years	the	endogenous	variable	in	this	study	(Staiger	
and	Stock	1997).	The	significant	positive	link	between	the	reform	and	educational	outcome	
in	 this	 study	 is	 completely	 consistent	with	 the	 findings	 from	previous	 studies	 for	Vietnam	
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implemented	by	Dang	(2017a,	2017b)	that	also	use	the	same	reform	as	an	 instrument	 for	
exogenous	variations	on	years	of	schooling.		
The	second-stage	estimates	also	indicate	that	education	has	a	significant	positive	effect	
on	non-wage	benefits.	The	estimated	coefficient	in	the	second-stage	is	infered	as	the	local	
average	treatment	effect.	In	particular,	an	additional	year	of	schooling	significantly	rises	the	
likelihood	of	receiving	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	by	about	6	percentage	points	
(column	1),	the	likelihood	of	receiving	monetary	employee	benefits	by	about	4.6	percentage	
points	(column	2),	the	possibility	of	having	annual	paid	leave	by	roughly	7.3	percentage	points	
(columm	3)	and	the	probability	of	having	firm-provided	social	insurance	by	approximately	6.8	
percentage	points	(column	4).	The	findings	suggest	that	the	causal	effect	of	years	of	schooling	
on	non-wage	compensation	exists	thoroughly	in	Vietnam.	Specifically,	additional	education	
significantly	 rises	 non-wage	 compensation,	 in	 particular	 monetary	 payments	 for	 public	
holidays,	monetary	employee	benefits,	annual	paid	leave	and	firm-provided	social	insurance.		
It	is	also	absorbing	to	mention	that	the	2SLS	estimates	are	larger	than	the	corresponding	
OLS	 estimates.	 This	 implies	 that	OLS	 estimator	 to	 some	extent	 likely	 produces	 the	biased	
estimates	compared	to	the	estimates	using	2SLS	estimator.	Yet,	the	differences	of	the	impact	
for	each	dependent	variable	are	comparably	not	sizable.	Specifically,	these	differences	are	
about	1.6	percentage	points	for	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays,	2	percentage	points	
for	 monetary	 employee	 benefits,	 0.7	 percentage	 points	 for	 annual	 paid	 leave	 and	 0.3	
percentage	points	for	firm-provided	social	insurance.		
In	 addition	 to	 presenting	 the	 OLS	 and	 2SLS	 estimates,	 this	 paper	 also	 discusses	 the	
reduced-form	estimates	of	the	impact	of	exposure	to	the	reform	on	non-wage	compensation.	
This	 allows	 us	 to	 varify	 if	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	 validly	 affects	 non-wage	 benefits.	 	 The	
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estimates	 from	 Panel	 C	 of	 Table	 2	 show	 that	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	 is	 significantly	 and	
positively	related	to	all	four	non-wage	benefits.	Specifically,	workers	who	were	exposed	to	
the	reform	are	11.4	percentage	points	more	likely	to	receive	monetary	payments	for	public	
holidays	(column	1),	8.8	percentage	points	more	likely	to	receive	monetary	employee	benefits	
(column	2),	13.8	percentage	points	more	likely	to	have	annual	leave	paid	(column	3)	and	13	
percentage	points	more	likely	to	have	firm-provided	social	insurance	(column	4).	Apparently,	
the	reform	has	a	considerable	favorable	impact	on	non-wage	compensation	in	Vietnam.		
	
6	 Robustness	Checks	
Next,	this	section	discusses	some	key	robustness	checks	of	the	baseline	estimates.	The	paper	
implements	 three	 checks	 for	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 baseline	 estimates	 by	 (i)	 estimating	 other	
various	specifications	that	are	different	from	the	baseline	specification	by	changing	the	set	of	
control	variables,	(ii)	estimating	the	baseline	specification	using	various	sub-samples	created	
by	 using	 different	 bandwidths,	 and	 (iii)	 estimating	 the	 baseline	 specification	 with	 a	 sub-
sample	that	excludes	observations	from	Ha	Noi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City,	two	largest	provinces	
in	Vietnam.	The	estimated	results	of	robustness	checks	are	presented	in	Tables	3–5.	
	
6.1	 Using	Various	Specifications	
Firstly,	Table	3	reports	the	estimated	coefficients	using	two	various	specifications,	including	
(i)	a	parsimony	specification	that	excludes	all	available	control	variables	 from	the	baseline	
specification	as	shown	in	column	1,	and	(ii)	a	full	specification	that	adds	more	control	variables	
in	 particular	 dummies	 for	 six	 geographical	 regions	 in	 Vietnam	 to	 control	 for	 the	 regional	
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variation	into	the	baseline	specification	as	shown	in	column	2	of	each	dependent	variable.	In	
general,	the	estimated	coefficients	indicate	that	when	the	paper	uses	different	specifications	
the	estimated	results	of	the	impact	of	education	on	non-wage	benefits	are	highly	identical	to	
the	baseline	results	in	terms	of	the	signs	and	the	magnitudes	of	the	impact.	The	coefficients	
maintain	their	statistical	significances	at	1%	level	and	also	suggest	the	positive	links	between	
years	of	schooling	and	non-wage	benefits.		
Specifically,	 the	OLS	 estimates	 in	 Panel	 A	 of	 Table	 3	 show	 that	 an	 additional	 year	 of	
schooling	is	more	likely	to	link	to	a	4.8	(column	1)	or	4.4	percentage	points	(column	2)	increase	
in	the	probability	of	receiving	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays,	a	3	(column	1)	or	2.7	
percentage	points	 (column	2)	 increase	 in	 the	probability	 of	 receiving	monetary	 employee	
benefits,	a	6.9	(column	1)	or	6.7	percentage	points	(column	2)	rise	in	the	possibility	of	having	
annual	paid	leave	and	a	6.8	(column	1)	or	6.7	(column	2)	rise	in	the	possibility	of	having	firm-
provided	social	insurance.	It	is	obvious	that	there	is	increase	in	the	magnitude	of	the	point	
estimates	of	the	OLS	estimates	in	Table	3	compared	to	the	baseline	OLS	estimates	in	Table	2	
although	this	change	is	very	comparably	small.		
The	2SLS	estimates	in	Panel	B	of	Table	3	are	highly	robust	to	the	baseline	estimates	in	
Table	2	for	both	first-	and	second-stage	estimates.	The	first-stage	estimates	apparently	show	
a	significant	and	positive	impact	of	the	reform	on	schooling	years	with	F-statistics	of	60.71	
(parsimony	specification)	or	91.24	(full	specification).	The	magnitude	of	the	first-stage	impact	
is	 roughly	1.68	 years	of	 schooling	 for	parsimony	 specification	 (column	1)	or	 1.71	 years	of	
schooling	 for	 full	 specification	 (column	2).	 For	 the	 second-stage	 results,	one	more	year	of	
schooling	 causally	 rises	 the	 probability	 of	 non-wage	 benefits,	 in	 particular	 monetary	
payments	 for	 public	 holidays	 by	 about	 6	 or	 6.1	 percentage	 points,	 monetary	 employee	
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benefits	by	roughly	4.7	or	4.8	percentage	points,	annual	paid	leave	by	approximately	7.2	or	
7.3	 percentage	 points	 and	 firm-provided	 social	 insurance	 by	 nearly	 6.6	 or	 6.8	 percentage	
points.		
Again,	the	reduced-form	estimates	using	parsimony	and	full	specifications	in	Panel	C	of	
Table	3	also	confirm	a	significant	and	positive	impact	the	reform	on	non-wage	benefits.	The	
magnitudes	of	the	impacts	are	arround	the	baseline	estimates	although	they	are	slightly	lower	
than	the	baseline	ones.	Specifically,	workers	exposed	to	the	reform	are	more	likely	to	reach	
non-wage	benefits	by	approximately	10.1	or	10.4	percentage	points	for	monetary	payments	
for	public	holidays,	7.9	or	8.2	percentage	points	for	monetary	employee	benefits,	12	or	12.5	
percentage	points	for	annual	paid	leave	and	11.1	or	11.7	percentage	points	for	firm-provided	
social	insurance.		
	
6.2	 Using	Different	Bandwidth	Choices	
Secondly,	 Table	 4	 reports	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 using	different	 bandwidth	 choices	 to	
create	corresponding	sub-samples,	including	(i)	1969–1984	birth	years	(6,974	observations),	
(ii)	 1970–1983	 birth	 years	 (6,038	 observations),	 (iii)	 1971–1982	 birth	 years	 (5,032	
observations),	and	 (iv)	1972–1981	birth	years	 (4,071	observations).	The	paper	also	 finds	a	
significant	and	positive	relationship	between	schooling	years	and	non-wage	benefits	using	all	
specifications	for	all	sub-samples.	These	estimates	still	keep	their	statistical	significances	at	
1%	 level	 as	 the	 baseline	 estimates.	 Crucially,	 the	 point	 estimates	 tend	 to	 be	 around	 the	
baseline	ones	in	terms	of	their	magnitudes.		
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The	OLS	estimates	from	Panel	A	of	Table	4	indicates	that	education	is	postively	correlated	
with	non-wage	compensation.	In	particular,	the	increasing	probability	of	non-wage	benefits	
stemming	from	having	an	extra	year	of	schooling	is	4.3–4.4	percentage	points	for	monetary	
payments	for	public	holidays	(column	1),	2.6–2.7	percentage	points	for	monetary	employee	
benefits	 (column	2),	0.67	percentage	points	 for	annual	paid	 leave	 (column	3)	and	6.6–6.7	
percentage	points	(column	4).		
The	 2SLS	 estimates	 from	 Panel	 B	 of	 Table	 4	 also	 show	 the	 strong	 robust	 impact	 of	
schooling	on	non-wage	compensation	comparable	 to	 the	baseline	2SLS	estimates.	For	 the	
first-stage,	exposure	to	the	reform	increases	education	by	1.42–1.8	years	of	schooling	with	
the	F-statistics	on	excluded	instrument	of	between	59.79–71.47.	When	we	narrow	the	sample	
with	 a	 smaller	 bandwidth,	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 first-stage	 estimate	 is	 relatively	 lower	
although	 the	 decrease	 is	 relatively	 insignificant.	 This	 is	 probably	 due	 to	 a	 fact	 that	 the	
individuals	whose	birth	years	are	closer	to	the	birth	year	cutoff	(1977)	tends	to	have	a	more	
similar	educational	pattern.	Therefore,	the	impact	of	the	reform	for	workers	born	arround	
the	cutoff	are	more	likely	lower	than	that	for	a	group	included	both	workers	born	far	from	
the	 cutoff.	 The	 second-stage	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 one	more	 year	 of	 schooling	 causally	
increases	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	by	5.4–6.2	percentage	points	(column	1),	
monetary	employee	benefits	by	2.9–4.6	percentage	points	(column	2),	annual	paid	leave	by	
6.4–7.6	 percentage	 points	 (column	 3)	 and	 firm-provided	 social	 insurance	 by	 6.1–7.1	
percentage	points	(column	4).	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 reduced-form	 estimation	 results,	 the	 estimates	 in	 Panel	 C	 of	 Table	 4	
indicate	that	individuals	exposed	to	the	reform	tend	to	have	a	higher	likelihood	of	receiving	
monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	by	7.6–11.2	percentage	points	(column	1),	a	higher	
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likelihood	of	receiving	monetary	employee	benefits	by	4.1–8.2	percentage	points	(column	2),	
a	larger	possibility	of	having	annual	paid	leave	by	9.1–13.7	percentage	points	(column	3)	and	
a	 larger	possibility	of	having	 firm-provided	social	 insurance	by	8.7–12.8	percentage	points	
(column	4)	compared	to	the	counterpart	individuals.		
	
6.3	 Other	Robustness	Checks	
Finally,	the	paper	estimates	the	effect	with	a	sub-sample	that	removes	observations	from	Ha	
Noi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City,	two	largest	provinces	in	Vietnam.	Ha	Noi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	have	
the	most	active	labor	markets	in	Vietnam.	Economic	activities	and	employments	in	these	two	
cities	 contribute	 the	 largest	 proportions	 to	 the	 economy’s	 whole	 economic	 activities.	
Therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	check	the	sensitivity	of	the	baseline	results	to	the	estimates	from	
a	sub-sample	without	workers	in	Ha	Noi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City.	There	are	1,370	observations	
from	Ha	Noi	and	Ho	Chi	Minh	City	that	amount	to	about	17%	of	the	whole	sample	that	all	
observations	 from	 63	 Vietnamese	 provinces.	 The	 estimated	 coefficients	 are	 presented	 in	
Table	5	with	a	sub-sample	of	6,495	observations.		
The	results	show	that	there	is	no	differences	between	the	estimated	coefficients	in	Table	
5	and	the	baseline	estimates	in	Table	2	in	terms	of	both	the	signs	and	the	magnitudes	of	the	
impacts.	 The	 positive	 impacts	 for	 all	 outcomes	 of	 non-wage	 benefits	 using	 available	
estimation	models	are	established	with	a	1%	statistical	significance	level.	The	OLS	estimates	
in	Panel	A	of	Table	5	illustrate	that	workers	who	have	an	additional	year	of	schooling	are	on	
average	4.6	percentage	points	more	 likely	 to	 gain	monetary	payments	 for	public	holidays	
(column	 1),	 2.5	 percentage	 points	 more	 likely	 to	 acquire	 monetary	 employee	 benefits	
(column	2),	6.7	percentage	points	more	likely	to	have	annual	paid	leave	(column	3)	and	6.6	
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percentage	points	more	likely	to	hold	firm-provided	social	 insurance	(column	4)	than	their	
counterparts.		
Meanwhile,	the	2SLS	coefficients	in	Panel	B	of	Table	5	also	show	very	strongly	consistent	
estimates	of	the	impact	for	both	the	first-	and	second-stage	estimates.	In	the	first-stage,	the	
reform	on	average	increases	workers’	educational	outcome	by	roughly	1.9	years	of	schooling	
that	is	similar	to	the	baseline	first-stage	estimate.	Also	the	F-statistics	on	excluded	instrument	
is	71.77	that	is	very	close	to	the	baseline	corresponding	figure.	For	the	second-stage	results,	
one	more	year	of	schooling	results	 in	a	6.3	percentage	point	 increase	 in	the	probability	of	
receiving	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	(column	1),	a	4.2	percentage	point	increase	
in	the	possibility	of	gaining	monetary	employee	benefits	(column	2),	a	7.5	percentage	point	
increase	in	the	probability	of	having	annual	paid	leave	(column	3)	and	a	7.1	percentage	point	
increase	in	the	likelihood	of	having	firm-provided	social	insurance	(column	4).		
The	reduced-form	estimates	as	indicated	in	Panel	C	of	Table	5	show	that	the	reform	is	
also	significantly	and	positively	linked	to	non-wage	compensation.	Specifically,	exposure	to	
the	reform	causes	for	a	worker	a	higher	probability	to	receive	monetary	payments	for	public	
holidays	by	about	11.9	percentage	points	(column	1),	a	higher	probability	to	gain	monetary	
employee	benefits	by	nearly	8.1	percentage	points	(column	2),	a	higher	probability	to	have	
annual	 paid	 leave	 by	 approximately	 14.2	 percentage	 points	 (column	 3)	 and	 a	 higher	
probability	to	have	firm-provided	social	insurance	by	roughly	13.3	percentage	points	(column	
4).		
It	 is	 conclusive	 that	 the	 results	 of	 robustness	 checks	 as	 presented	 above	 extremely	
confirm	the	strongly	robust	baseline	estimates	of	the	causal	impact	of	schooling	on	non-wage	
in	terms	of	both	the	sign	and	the	magnitude	of	the	impacts.		
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7	 Potential	Mechanisms	
This	section	inspects	crucial	mechanisms	through	which	schooling	has	a	positive	impact	on	
non-wage	benefits	 in	Vietnam	as	 indicated	 in	 the	section	of	emprical	 results.	We	propose	
three	key	mediators	behind	the	causal	link	between	education	and	non-wage	compensation	
that	consist	of	(i)	formal	employment,	(ii)	skilled	occupation	and	(iii)	employee-friendly	firm.	
It	is	expected	that	education	is	significantly	related	to	these	mediators	which	in	turn	affects	
non-wage	 benefits.	 Table	 6	 domonstrates	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 of	 the	 impacts	 of	
schooling	on	three	mediating	factors.	Overall,	the	estimates	from	Table	6	show	that	education	
has	statistically	significant	and	positive	impacts	on	mediating	factors	measured	in	percentage	
points,	 in	 particular	 formal	 employment	 (column	 1),	 skilled	 occupation	 (column	 2)	 and	
employee-friendly	 firm	 (column	3).	The	 results	and	discussions	are	presented	 in	details	as	
follows.	
	
7.1	 Formal	Employment	
Although	the	Vietnamese	labor	market	has	been	developed	over	last	decades,	it	so	far	owns	
a	 weakly	 institutionalized	 system	 with	 imperfect	 functionings	 especially	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
defective	implementation	and	compliance	of	labor	market	institutions	and	policies	(Schmillen	
and	 Packard	 2016).4	 Under	 this	 context,	 there	 is	 the	 co-existence	 of	 formal	 and	 informal	
																																																						
4	For	example,	under	the	regulation	of	the	Vietnamese	Labor	Code	that	was	first	introduced	in	1994,	for	all	jobs	
with	a	duration	of	at	least	three	months	a	written	employment	contract	must	be	signed	between	employers	and	
employees.	However,	the	implementation	is	poorly	carried	out	in	reality	as	consequences	of	the	existence	of	
labor	market	 imperfections	such	insufficient	 legal	supervision,	 lack	of	 information	and	modest	 labor	mobility	
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employment	 sectors	 within	 the	 Vietnamese	 labor	 market.	 As	 a	 result,	 there	 exists	 a	
considerable	fraction	of	unregistered	or	informal	workers	relative	to	the	amount	of	formal	
workers	in	this	emerging	economy	(Huong	et	al.	2013;	Schmillen	and	Packard	2016).		
Furthermore,	the	labor	market	dualism	likely	has	a	significant	impact	on	inquality	in	labor	
market	 outcomes.5	 In	 reality,	 formal	 and	 informal	 workers	 receive	 discriminated	
compensation	packages	in	terms	of	both	wage	and	non-wage	benefits	in	Vietnam	(Rand	and	
Tarp	2011).	Some	previous	studies	for	examples	McCaig	and	Pavcnik	(2015)	and	Nguyen	et	al.	
(2013)	emphasize	that	working	with	an	informal	job	is	significantly	and	negatively	related	to	
wage	compensation	 in	Vietnam.	Regarding	non-wage	compensation,	while	formal	workers	
who	work	under	the	legal	protection	of	the	employment	law	receive	better	benefits,	informal	
workers	 who	 work	 for	 informal	 firms	 within	 the	 underground	 economy	 tend	 to	 receive	
relatively	low	wage	and	loss	basic	non-wage	benefits	(Huong	et	al.	2013;	Rand	and	Tarp	2011).	
As	 a	 result,	 informal	 workers	 are	 extremely	 vulnerable	 to	 the	 shocks	 for	 examples	
unemployment,	health	problems,	aging	or	even	natural	disasters	in	the	existence	of	the	lack	
of	social	protection	(Huong	et	al.	2013).		
Because	differences	 in	non-wage	benefits	provided	 to	workers	between	 informal	 and	
formal	 firms,	 workers	 individually	 have	 strong	 motivations	 to	 find	 to	 reach	 the	 formal	
employment	(McCaig	and	Pavcnik	2015).	The	role	of	education	is	more	apparent	to	improve	
																																																						
(Brassard	2004).	Numerous	firms	especially	small-sized	ones	have	strong	motivations	to	disobey	the	legislative	
regulation	to	in	order	to	minimize	costs	related	to	labor	uses	in	Vietnam	(Schmillen	and	Packard	2016).		
5	The	context	of	labor	market	dualism	has	been	used	for	the	study	of	labor	market	outcome	differentials	in	many	
developing	 countries	 for	 examples	Argentina	 (Pratap	 and	Quintin	 2006),	 Brazil	 (Botelho	 and	Ponczek	2011),	
China	(Maurer-Fazio	and	Dinh	2004),	Columbia	(Magnac	1991),	South	Africa	(Badaoui	et	al.	2008),	and	Mexico	
(Maloney	1999).	
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the	receipt	of	non-wage	benefits	for	any	worker	through	achieving	a	formal	job.	In	this	study,	
formal	employment	is	used	as	a	primary	mediator	to	explain	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	
non-wage	compensation.	Importantly,	in	this	study	formal	employment	is	measured	by	the	
probability	a	worker	to	achive	a	formal	written	employment	contract	with	her	or	his	current	
paid	job.		
Actually,	we	find	that	expanded	education	leads	to	a	statistically	significant	increase	in	
the	probability	to	find	a	job	in	the	formal	sector	as	shown	in	column	1	of	Table	6.	In	particular,	
the	OLS	estimate	in	Panel	A	indicates	that	an	additional	year	of	schooling	is	significantly	and	
positively	linked	to	a	6	percentage	point	increase	in	the	likelihood	of		formal	employment.	
Meanwhile,	the	2SLS	estimate	in	Panel	B	shows	that	one	extra	year	of	education	results	in	an	
increase	in	the	probability	of	formal	employment	by	about	8.4	percentage	points.	Moreover,	
using	a	reduced-form	regression	the	paper	finds	that	workers	exposed	to	the	reform	are	16	
percentage	points	more	likely	to	achieve	a	formal	employment	than	those	were	out	of	the	
reform	 as	 indicated	 in	 Panel	 C.	 The	 positive	 impact	 of	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	 on	 the	
probability	to	have	a	formal	job	is	graphically	demonstrated	in	part	(a)	of	Figure	3.	The	finding	
in	this	section	is	that	Vietnamese	educated	workers	tend	to	work	in	the	formal	sector	with	a	
written	 employment	 contract	 is	 entirely	 consitent	 with	 the	 results	 from	 previous	 studies	
(McCaig	 and	 Pavcnik	 2013,	 2015).	 This	 finding	 implicates	 that	 education	 plays	 a	 very	
important	role	for	workers	to	reach	the	formaility	in	their	career	paths.	More	importantly,	it	
is	likely	conclusive	of	the	confirmative	role	of	the	formal	employment	status	to	account	for	
the	causal	association	between	schooling	and	non-wage	compensation.		
	
7.2	 Skilled	Occupation	
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During	the	era	of	economic	reforms,	Vietnam	has	increasingly	emphasized	the	importance	of	
skilled	human	resources	as	a	primary	driver	of	economic	growth	and	development	(Bodewig	
et	al.	2014).	Therefore,	the	demand	for	educated	laborers	has	rised	as	a	consquence	of	the	
transformation	 of	 the	 Vietnamese	 economy	 from	 a	 traditional	 agriculture-based	 system	
towards	 a	 modern	 market-based	 economy	 with	 the	 considerable	 expansion	 of	 skilled	
occupations.	While	skilled	occupations	 include	managers,	professionals,	 technicians,	clerks	
and	 services	 and	 sales	 workers,	 unskilled	 occupations	 consist	 of	 craftsmen,	 machine	
operators,	manual	workers,	farming	workers	and	farmers.	Learning	process	equips	individuals	
with	 not	 only	 fundamental	 skills	 for	 examples	 sufficient	 reading,	 writing,	 calculating	 or	
problem	solving,	but	also	cognitive,	social	and	behavioral,	and	technical	skills	that	 in	turns	
boost	educated	workers’	capacities	to	acquire	qualified	occupational	vacancies	(Bodewig	et	
al.	2014).		
Furthermore,	 the	 qualification	 preference	 has	 traditionally	 become	 a	 cultural	 setting	
within	 the	 Vietnamese	 society.	 This	 perspective	 has	 been	 persistent	 over	 the	 years.	
Therefore,	it	is	a	rationale	that	Vietnamese	people	in	general	enormously	respect	those	who	
has	a	relatively	high	education.	In	a	analogous	manner,	firms	strongly	desire	to	recruit	skilled	
workers	to	fulfill	vacancies	from	skilled	occupations.	The	extremely	high	demand	for	skilled	
laborers	 is	more	 obvious	when	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 proficient	 human	 resources	 in	 Vietnam	
(Montague	2013).		
Skilled	 occupations	 provide	 workers	 with	 improved	 working	 conditions	 and	 better	
compensation	 packages	 including	 both	 wage	 and	 non-wage	 benefits	 relative	 to	 unskilled	
occupations.	Therefore,	obtaining	a	skilled	occupation	by	making	investments	in	schooling	is	
a	useful	bridge	to	connect	education	and	non-wage	benefits	in	the	Vietnamese	labor	market.	
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In	this	study,	based	on	the	available	VHLSS	data,	a	skilled	occupation	is	defined	as	one	of	the	
following	occupations:	leaders	or	managers,	professionals	or	technicians,	and	clerks	or	service	
workers.	 Meanwhile,	 agriculture,	 forestry,	 fishery	 workers,	 skilled	 workers	 or	 machine	
operators	and	unskilled	workers	are	classified	as	unskilled	occupations.		
Actually,	this	study	finds	that	education	is	significantly	and	positively	related	to	skilled	
occupation	as	indicated	in	column	2	of	Table	6.	Specifically,	an	extra	year	of	schooling	rises	
the	 probability	 of	 achieaving	 a	 skill	 occupation	 by	 about	 7.6	 percentage	 points	 using	OLS	
estimator	 (Panel	A)	or	5.7	percentage	points	using	2SLS	estimator	 (Panel	B).	Furthermore,	
being	exposed	to	the	reform	increases	a	worker’s	likelihood	to	work	with	a	skilled	occupation	
by	nearly	10.8	percentage	points	(Panel	C).	Moreover,	the	positive	impact	of	exposure	to	the	
reform	on	the	probability	to	work	with	a	skilled	occupation	is	graphically	represented	in	part	
(b)	of	Figure	3.		
	
7.3	 Employee-Friendly	Firm	
Ownership	 might	 affects	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	 firm	 provides	 non-wage	 benefits	 for	 its	
employees.	 For	 example,	 Nguyen	 and	 Ramstetter	 (2017)	 find	 that	 ownership	 structure	
contributes	 to	 wage	 differentials	 among	 workers	 who	 work	 for	 manufacturing	 firms	 in	
Vietnam.	Nguyen	and	Ramstetter	show	that	foreign	companies,	and	stated-owned	and	large	
firms	 tends	 to	 pay	 a	 higher	wage	 than	 small-sized	 domestic	 enterprises	 in	 this	 emerging	
economy.	 Moreover,	 the	 literature	 on	 wage	 inequality	 shows	 that	 firms	 with	 various	
ownerships	tend	to	pay	heterogeneously	due	to	their	different	preferences	of	skilled	workers	
(Afonso	2016).		
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This	 study	 defines	 employee-friendly	 firms	 as	 firms	 that	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 provide	
improved	working	 conditions	 for	workers	 and	more	 importantly	 are	 to	provide	non-wage	
benefits	 to	 their	 workers	 rather	 than	 merely	 wage	 compensation.	 Based	 on	 available	
information	about	firms’	ownership	structure	from	VHLSS	data,	this	study	defines	a	firm	has	
one	of	the	following	ownership	structures:	foreign	companies,	state-owned	enterprises	and	
sizable	private	firms	as	an	employee-friendly	firm.	In	contrast,	a	firm	whose	ownership	type	
is	 collective,	 independent	 production	 or	 business	 households,	 and	 farming,	 forestry	 and	
agricutural	households/individuals	is	not	regarded	as	an	employee-friendly	firm.		
This	paper	also	finds	a	significant	and	positive	relationship	between	education	and	the	
possibility	of	working	for	an	employee-friendly	firm	as	shown	in	column	3	of	Table	6.	The	OLS	
estimate	in	Panel	A	indicates	that	one	additional	year	of	schooling	is	positive	associated	with	
a	5.7	percentage	point	rise	in	the	probability	of	working	for	an	employee-friendly	firm.	The	
causal	 effect	 of	 an	 additional	 schooling	 year	 on	 the	 analogous	 outcome	 from	 the	 2SLS	
estimate	in	Panel	B	is	a	higher	likelihood	of	7.7	percentage	points.	In	addition,	the	reduce-
form	estimate	in	Panel	C	show	that	workers	exposed	to	the	reform	are	more	likely	to	work	
for	an	employee-friendly	firm	by	about	14.6	percentage	point	than	those	who	were	out	of	the	
reform.	 The	 positive	 impact	 of	 exposure	 to	 the	 reform	on	 the	 probability	 to	work	 for	 an	
employee-friendly	firm	is	graphically	demonstrated	in	part	(c)	of	Figure	3.	
	
8	 Discussion	and	Conclusion	
Using	the	Vietnamese	compulsory	primary	schooling	reform	as	an	instrument	for	exogenous	
shifts	in	years	of	schooling	enables	this	study	to	estimate	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	
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non-wage	 compensation	 in	 Vietnam.	 The	 estimates	 indicate	 that	 more	 schooling	 has	 a	
significant	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 probability	 to	 gain	 non-wage	 compensation	 specifically	
measured	by	monetary	payments	for	public	holidays,	monetary	employee	benefits,	annual	
paid	leave	and	firm-provided	social	insurance.		
Equally	 important,	 this	 paper	 also	 probes	 three	 causal	 pathways	 linking	 changes	 in	
schooling	 with	 the	 probability	 to	 gain	 non-wage	 benefits	 in	 the	 labor	 markets	 using	 the	
context	of	a	developing	country.		In	the	first	channel,	education	promotes	the	likelihood	for	
workers	 to	 reach	 formal	 jobs	 that	 in	 turn	 tend	 to	provide	better	non-wage	compensation	
relative	to	informal	jobs.	Another	pathway	is	that	the	role	of	skilled	occupation	through	which	
education	affects	non-wage	compensation.	The	more	educated	 is	 likely	 to	working	with	a	
skilled	occupation	and	by	this	link	he	or	she	gains	better	non-wage	benefits	compared	to	the	
less	 educated.	 Finally,	 more	 schooling	 provides	more	 changes	 to	 work	 for	 an	 employee-
friendly	firm	that	generously	give	its	employees	preferable	non-wage	compensation.		
This	paper	significantly	contributes	to	the	economics	literature	in	some	ways.	Firstly,	this	
paper	while	also	provides	more	evidence	on	the	causal	effect	of	schooling	on	labor	market	
outcomes	this	paper	switches	the	focus	away	from	wage	a	conventional	measure	of	 labor	
market	outcome	 to	non-wage	outcomes	 that	 also	play	 very	 important	 roles	 to	determine	
workers’	well-being.	The	private	returns	to	schooling	in	labor	markets	are	well-documented	
from	the	existing	literature.	However,	there	is	so	far	no	study	devoted	to	estimate	the	non-
wage	returns	to	schooling.	This	study	therefore	significantly	fulfills	the	research	gap	and	also	
provides	 a	more	 insightful	 understanding	of	 the	private	 returns	 to	 education	 in	 the	 labor	
markets.	
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Second,	the	nature	of	this	study	enables	us	to	emphasize	that	education	can	be	treated	
as	workers’	efficiently	protective	tool	in	the	workplace	to	ask	for	providing	non-wage	benefits	
from	 firms.	 Importantly,	 the	 problem	 that	 there	 is	 a	 deficient	 provision	 of	 workplace	
protections	has	increasingly	been	concerned	for	the	public	policy	implications	especially	 in	
developing	countries	where	there	exists	weakly	institutionalized	labor	markets	(Seshanna	and	
Decornez	2003).	When	public	interventions	and	legal	legislations	related	social	protections	in	
labor	 markets	 are	 seemingly	 failure	 to	 protect	 workers	 from	 disadvantaged	 working	
conditions	including	the	sufficient	provision	of	fundamental	non-wage	facilities	because	of	a	
fact	 that	 labor	market	 institutions	as	well	 as	policies	 are	poorly	 functioned	 (Afonso	2016;	
Checchi	and	García-Peñalosa	2008;	Fortin	and	Lemieux	1997),	education	has	been	regarded	
as	the	primary	determinant	of	the	employment	protection	(Perugini	and	Pompei	2016).	This	
study	evidently	indicates	that	education	can	improve	workers’	well-being	in	the	workplace	
through	acquiring	non-wage	compensation.		
Furthermore,	 some	 researchers	 recently	 attempt	 to	 examine	 the	 differences	 in	 the	
provision	of	non-wage	forms	of	compensation	in	the	workplace	from	developing	countries.	
There	are	some	factors	for	explaining	this	fact	 including	managers’	gender	(Rand	and	Tarp	
2011)	or	 the	probability	of	a	 firm	being	 registered	especially	 for	 small-	 and	medium-sized	
enterprises	 (Rand	 and	 Torm	 2012).	 This	 study	 shows	 that	 education	 is	 potentially	 an	
additional	important	determinant	of	non-wage	differentials	in	the	labor	markets.		
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Table	1	 Summary	statistics	of	the	sample	
Variable	 Full	sample	 	 Treatment	 	 Control	
Mean	 SD	 	 Mean	 SD	 	 Mean	 SD	
Non-wage	compensation	variables	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Monetary	payments	for	public	holidays	(=1	if	yes,	=0	
otherwise)	
0.707	 0.455	 	 0.747	 0.435	 	 0.646	 0.478	
Monetary	employee	benefits	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.542	 0.498	 	 0.574	 0.494	 	 0.495	 0.500	
Annual	paid	leave	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.565	 0.496	 	 0.613	 0.487	 	 0.493	 0.500	
Firm-provided	social	insurance	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.547	 0.498	 	 0.592	 0.492	 	 0.480	 0.500	
Control	variables	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Age	(years)	 34.243	 5.446	 	 30.525	 2.996	 	 39.746	 3.087	
Male	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.567	 0.495	 	 0.553	 0.497	 	 0.589	 0.492	
Urban	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.536	 0.499	 	 0.513	 0.500	 	 0.570	 0.495	
Majority	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.949	 0.219	 	 0.951	 0.215	 	 0.946	 0.225	
Married	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.796	 0.403	 	 0.738	 0.440	 	 0.883	 0.321	
Red	river	delta	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.216	 0.412	 	 0.232	 0.422	 	 0.192	 0.394	
Midlands	and	northern	mountainous	areas	(=1	if	yes,	=0	
otherwise)	
0.092	 0.289	 	 0.097	 0.296	 	 0.085	 0.279	
Northern	and	coastal	central	region	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.201	 0.401	 	 0.195	 0.396	 	 0.211	 0.408	
Central	highlands	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.044	 0.206	 	 0.041	 0.198	 	 0.050	 0.217	
Southeastern	area	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.232	 0.422	 	 0.231	 0.422	 	 0.233	 0.423	
Mekong	river	delta	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.214	 0.410	 	 0.204	 0.403	 	 0.230	 0.421	
Survey	2010	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.338	 0.473	 	 0.342	 0.474	 	 0.331	 0.471	
Survey	2012	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.340	 0.474	 	 0.332	 0.471	 	 0.350	 0.477	
Survey	2014	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.323	 0.468	 	 0.326	 0.469	 	 0.319	 0.466	
Mechanims		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Formal	employment	(=1	if	having	a	written	emloyment	
contract,	=0	otherwise)	
0.631	 0.482	 	 0.689	 0.463	 	 0.545	 0.498	
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Highly	skilled	occupation	(=1	if	clerks,	service	workers,	
professionals,	technicians,	leaders	and	managers,	=0	if	
unskilled	workers,	manual	workers/machine	operators,	
agricultural,	forestry	and	fishery	workers)	
0.445	 0.497	 	 0.483	 0.500	 	 0.389	 0.488	
Employee-friendly	firm	(=1	if	firm’s	ownership	is	private	
domestic,	state-owned,	or	foreign,	=0	firm’s	ownership	is	
farming,	household	business,	or	individual	production)	
0.676	 0.468	 	 0.728	 0.445	 	 0.599	 0.490	
Schooling	variables	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Schooling	reform	exposure	(=1	if	yes,	=0	otherwise)	 0.597	 0.491	 	 1	 0	 	 0	 0	
Schooling	years	(years)	 10.575	 4.264	 	 11.252	 3.849	 	 9.572	 4.637	
Observations	 7,865	 	 4,694	 	 3,171	
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Table	2		 The	impact	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation:	Baseline	estimates	
	 Monetary	
payments	for	
public	holidays	
	 Monetary	
employee	
benefits	
	
	
	
Annual	paid	
leave	
	 Firm-provided	
social	
insurance	
(1)	 	 (2)	 	 (3)	 	 (4)	
Panel	A.	OLS	regressions	
Schooling	years	 0.044***	
(0.003)	
	 0.026***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.066***	
(0.003)	
	 0.065***	
(0.003)	
Panel	B.	2SLS	regressions	
Second	stage:	Schooling	
years	
0.060***	
(0.006)	
	 0.046***	
(0.008)	
	
	
0.073***	
(0.007)	
	 0.068***	
(0.008)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	
schooling	years):	Schooling	
reform	exposure	
1.902***	
(0.121)	
	 1.902***	
(0.121)	
	
	
1.902***	
(0.121)	
	 1.902***	
(0.121)	
F-stat	on	excluded	
instrument	
76.06	 	 76.06	 	 76.06	 	 76.06	
Panel	C.	Reduced-form	regressions	
Schooling	reform	exposure	 0.114***	
(0.013)	
	 0.088***	
(0.015)	
	
	
0.138***	
(0.015)	
	 0.130***	
(0.016)	
Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 7,865	 	 7,865	 	 7,865	 	 7,865	
Notes:	 ***p	 <	0.01,	**p	 <	0.05,	*p	 <	0.1.	Robust	 standard	errors	are	 clustered	at	 the	provincial	 level	 and	
reported	in	parenthesis.	Control	variables	consist	of	age,	squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	married.	
Bandwidth:	1968–1985.		
Source:	author'	calculations	based	on	Vietnam	Household	Living	Standards	Survey	2010,	2012	and	2014.	
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Table	3	 The	impact	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation:	Robustness,	various	specifications	
	 Monetary	payments	for	
public	holidays	
	 Monetary	employee	
benefits	
	 Annual	paid	leave	 	 Firm-provided	social	
insurance	
(1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	 	 (1)	 (2)	
Panel	A.	OLS	regressions	
Schooling	years		 0.048***	
(0.003)	
0.044***	
(0.003)	
	 0.030***	
(0.003)	
0.027***	
(0.003)	
	 0.069***	
(0.003)	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
	 0.068***	
(0.003)	
0.067***	
(0.002)	
Panel	B.	2SLS	regressions	
Second	stage:	Schooling	years		 0.060***	
(0.007)	
0.061***	
(0.006)	
	 0.047***	
(0.009)	
0.048***	
(0.009)	
	 0.072***	
(0.008)	
0.073***	
(0.007)	
	 0.066***	
(0.009)	
0.068***	
(0.008)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	
schooling	years):	Schooling	
reform	exposure	
1.676***	
(0.132)	
1.712***	
(0.116)	
	
	
1.676***	
(0.132)	
1.712***	
(0.116)	
	 1.676***	
(0.132)	
1.712***	
(0.116)	
	 1.676***	
(0.132)	
1.712***	
(0.116)	
F-stat	on	excluded	instrument	 60.71	 91.24	 	 60.71	 91.24	 	 60.71	 91.24	 	 60.71	 91.24	
Panel	C.	Reduced-form	regressions	
Schooling	reform	exposure	 0.101***	
(0.014)	
0.104***	
(0.013)	
	 0.079***	
(0.017)	
0.082***	
(0.016)	
	 0.120***	
(0.017)	
0.125***	
(0.017)	
	 0.111***	
(0.018)	
0.117***	
(0.018)	
Controls	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	 	 No	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	 	 Yes	 Yes	
Observations	 7,865	 7,865	 	 7,865	 7,865	 	 7,865	 7,865	 	 7,865	 7,865	
Notes:	***p	<	0.01,	**p	<	0.05,	*p	<	0.1.	Robust	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	provincial	level	and	reported	in	parenthesis.	Control	variables	consist	of	age,	
squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	married	and	dummies	for	six	geographical	regions.	Bandwidth:	1968–1985.		
Source:	author'	calculations	based	on	Vietnam	Household	Living	Standards	Survey	2010,	2012	and	2014.	
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Table	4	 The	impact	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation:	Robustness,	various	bandwidths	
	 Monetary	
payments	for	
public	holidays	
	 Monetary	
employee	
benefits	
	 Annual	paid	
leave	
	 Firm-provided	
social	
insurance	
(1)	 	 (2)	 	 (3)	 	 (4)	
Panel	A.	OLS	regressions	
Bandwidth:	1969–1984	
(Observations:	6,974):	Schooling	
years		
0.044***	
(0.003)	
	
	
	
0.027***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
Bandwidth:	1970–1983	
(Observations:	6,038):	Schooling	
years		
0.044***	
(0.003)	
	
	
	
0.026***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
Bandwidth:	1971–1982	
(Observations:	5,032):	Schooling	
years		
0.044***	
(0.004)	
	
	
	
0.026***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
Bandwidth:	1972–1981	
(Observations:	4,071):	Schooling	
years		
0.043***	
(0.004)	
	
	
	
0.026***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.066***	
(0.003)	
Panel	B.	2SLS	regressions	
Bandwidth:	1969–1984	
(Observations:	6,974)	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
Second	stage:	Schooling	years		 0.062***	
(0.006)	
	 0.046***	
(0.009)	
	
	
0.076***	
(0.008)	
	
	
0.071***	
(0.008)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	schooling	
years):	Schooling	reform	
exposure	
1.798***	
(0.122)	
	
	
1.798***	
(0.122)	
	
	
1.798***	
(0.122)	
	
	
1.798***	
(0.122)	
F-stat	on	excluded	instrument	 71.47	 	 71.47	 	 71.47	 	 71.47	
Bandwidth:	1970–1983	
(Observations:	6,038)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Second	stage:	Schooling	years		 0.058***	
(0.006)	
	 0.042***	
(0.010)	
	
	
0.074***	
(0.009)	
	
	
0.070***	
(0.009)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	schooling	
years):	Schooling	reform	
exposure	
1.745***	
(0.130)	
	
	
1.745***	
(0.130)	
	
	
1.745***	
(0.130)	
	
	
1.745***	
(0.130)	
F-stat	on	excluded	instrument	 65.88	 	 65.88	 	 65.88	 	 65.88	
Bandwidth:	1971–1982		
(Observations:	5,032)	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
Second	stage:	Schooling	years		 0.054***	
(0.008)	
	 0.034***	
(0.011)	
	
	
0.069***	
(0.010)	
	
	
0.065***	
(0.011)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	schooling	
years):	Schooling	reform	
exposure	
1.513***	
(0.135)	
	
	
1.513***	
(0.135)	
	
	
1.513***	
(0.135)	
	
	
1.513***	
(0.135)	
F-stat	on	excluded	instrument	 59.79	 	 59.79	 	 59.79	 	 59.79	
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Bandwidth:	1972–1981		
(Observations:	4,071)	
	
	
	
	
	 	 	 	 	
Second	stage:	Schooling	years		 0.054***	
(0.009)	
	 0.029**	
(0.012)	
	
	
0.064***	
(0.011)	
	
	
0.061***	
(0.012)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	
schooling	years):	Schooling	
reform	exposure	
1.415***	
(0.140)	
	
	
1.415***	
(0.140)	
	
	
1.415***	
(0.140)	
	
	
1.415***	
(0.140)	
F-stat	on	excluded	instrument	 64.41	 	 64.41	 	 64.41	 	 64.41	
Panel	C.	Reduced-form	regressions	
Bandwidth:	1969–1984:	Schooling	
reform	exposure	(Observations:	
6,974)	
0.112***	
(0.014)	
	
	
	
0.082***	
(0.016)	
	
	
0.137***	
(0.016)	
	
	
0.128***	
(0.017)	
Bandwidth:	1970–1983:	Schooling	
reform	exposure	(Observations:	
6,038)	
0.101***	
(0.014)	
	
	
	
0.073***	
(0.016)	
	
	
0.129***	
(0.018)	
	
	
0.121***	
(0.019)	
Bandwidth:	1971–1982:	Schooling	
reform	exposure	(Observations:	
5,032)	
0.082***	
(0.015)	
	
	
	
0.051***	
(0.017)	
	
	
0.104***	
(0.017)	
	
	
0.098***	
(0.018)	
Bandwidth:	1972–1981:	Schooling	
reform	exposure	(Observations:	
4,071)	
0.076***	
(0.016)	
	
	
	
0.041**	
(0.018)	
	
	
0.091***	
(0.019)	
	
	
0.087***	
(0.020)	
Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Notes:	***p	<	0.01,	**p	<	0.05,	*p	<	0.1.	Robust	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	provincial	level	and	reported	
in	parenthesis.	Control	variables	consist	of	age,	squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	married.		
Source:	author'	calculations	based	on	Vietnam	Household	Living	Standards	Survey	2010,	2012	and	2014.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 45	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Table	5	 The	impact	of	schooling	on	non-wage	compensation:	Robustness,	excluding	Ha	Noi	and	Ho	Chi	
Minh	City	
	 Monetary	
payments	for	
public	holidays	
	 Monetary	
employee	
benefits	
	
	
	
Annual	paid	
leave	
	 Firm-provided	
social	
insurance	
(1)	 	 (2)	 	 (3)	 	 (4)	
Panel	A.	OLS	regressions	
Schooling	years		 0.046***	
(0.004)	
	 0.025***	
(0.004)	
	
	
0.067***	
(0.003)	
	 0.066***	
(0.003)	
Panel	B.	2SLS	regressions	
Second	stage:	Schooling	
years		
0.063***	
(0.006)	
	 0.042***	
(0.009)	
	
	
0.075***	
(0.006)	
	 0.071***	
(0.007)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	
schooling	years):	Schooling	
reform	exposure	
1.903***	
(0.134)	
	 1.903***	
(0.134)	
	
	
1.903***	
(0.134)	
	 1.903***	
(0.134)	
F-stat	on	excluded	
instrument	
71.77	 	 71.77	 	 71.77	 	 71.77	
Panel	C.	Reduced-form	regressions	
Schooling	reform	exposure	 0.119***	
(0.015)	
	 0.081***	
(0.018)	
	
	
0.142***	
(0.016)	
	 0.133***	
(0.017)	
Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 6,495	 	 6,495	 	 6,495	 	 6,495	
Notes:	 ***p	 <	0.01,	**p	 <	0.05,	*p	 <	0.1.	Robust	 standard	errors	are	 clustered	at	 the	provincial	 level	 and	
reported	in	parenthesis.	Control	variables	consist	of	age,	squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	married.	The	
sample	 excludes	 observations	 from	 Ha	 Noi	 and	 Ho	 Chi	 Minh	 City	 (two	 largest	 provinces	 in	 Vietnam).	
Bandwidth:	1968–1985.		
Source:	author'	calculations	based	on	Vietnam	Household	Living	Standards	Survey	2010,	2012	and	2014.	
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Table	6	 Potential	mechanisms:	The	impact	of	schooling	on	formal	employment,	skilled	occupation	
and	employee-friendly	firm	
	 Fomal	
employment	
	 Skilled	
occupation	
	 Employee-
friendly	firm	
(1)	 	 (2)	 	 (3)	
Panel	A.	OLS	regressions	
Schooling	years		 0.060***	
(0.003)	
	
	
0.076***	
(0.002)	
	
	
0.057***	
(0.003)	
Panel	B.	2SLS	regressions	
Second	stage:	Schooling	years		 0.084***	
(0.007)	
	
	
0.057***	
(0.006)	
	
	
0.077***	
(0.007)	
First-stage	(Outcome	is	schooling	
years):	Schooling	reform	exposure	
1.902***	
(0.121)	
	
	
1.902***	
(0.121)	
	
	
1.902***	
(0.121)	
F-stat	on	excluded	instrument	 76.06	 	 76.06	 	 76.06	
Panel	C.	Reduced-form	regressions	
Schooling	reform	exposure	 0.160***	
(0.013)	
	
	
0.108***	
(0.013)	
	
	
0.146***	
(0.014)	
Controls	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Survey	year	fixed	effects	 Yes	 	 Yes	 	 Yes	
Observations	 7,865	 	 7,865	 	 7,865	
Notes:	***p	<	0.01,	**p	<	0.05,	*p	<	0.1.	Robust	standard	errors	are	clustered	at	the	provincial	level	
and	reported	in	parenthesis.	Control	variables	consist	of	age,	squared	age,	male,	urban,	majority,	and	
married.	Bandwidth:	1968–1985.		
Source:	author'	calculations	based	on	Vietnam	Household	Living	Standards	Survey	2010,	2012	and	
2014.	
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Fig.	1	 First-stage:	Schooling	reform	exposure	–	Schooling	years	
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Fig.	2	 Reduced-form:	Schooling	reform	exposure	–	Non-wage	compensation	
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Fig.	3	Reduced-form:	Schooling	reform	exposure	–	Formal	employment,	skilled	occupation	and	employee-friendly	firm	
	
	
	
	
	
